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The present work investigated the generation of behavioral plans when 
multiple goals are activated. The simultaneous presence of several goals may 
introduce goal-conflict, implying the need to exercise goal choice. Such conflict may 
be avoided via “multifinal” means affording the joint pursuit of the conflicting goals. 
Multifinal means are likely to constitute a subset of the total set of means to the focal 
goal. Concentrating attention on those means should reduce the number of means to 
the focal goal. This should introduce instability in one’s means preferences as 
function of the alternative goals that happened to be activated. These notions were 
empirically tested in three studies. Study 1 indicated that a subtle reminder of goal-
alternatives narrowed the means’ set to the current goal of “having lunch” to means 
that afforded successful attainment of this goal while saving time for other goals. 
Study 2 and 3 explored two boundary conditions of such multifinality-based 
narrowing of the focal-means set size namely, (1) feasibility of identifying multifinal 
  
means given the nature of the co-active goals and (2) degree of commitment to the 
focal goal. Specifically, Study 2 found that the relation between perceived feasibility 
of finding multifinal means and the reduction in the means’ set-size selected for the 
focal goal is curvilinear. In other words, substantial reduction may occur at an 
intermediate range of feasibility, while no reduction may occur where finding 
alternative means is either highly feasible or relatively unfeasible. Finally, Study 3 
found that high commitment to the focal goal results in the inhibition of the 
alternative goal relaxing its multifinality constraints and allowing the set of focal 
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Lay and scientific notions of motivation have long acknowledged that goal pursuit 
may be affected by the simultaneous presence of alternative goals. Often such 
circumstance was characterized in terms of goal-conflict whose resolution demands the 
exercise of choice between clashing objectives. An early such analysis was offered by the 
14th Century French philosopher Jean Buridan who satirized it in a well known parable. It 
recounts the tale of a hungry ass standing between two equally appetizing bales of hay. 
Although obviously motivated to eat, the ass is unable to choose, and eventually dies of 
hunger in the face of bounty (see Turner, 1903).  
Classic motivational research too, has demonstrated that the presence of 
alternative goals creates conflict that may hamper progress toward any one of the present 
objectives (Lewin, 1935, 1951; Miller, 1944; Emmons & King, 1988; Van Hook & 
Higgins, 1988). More recently, Shah and Kruglanski (2002) showed that priming an 
alternative to a focal goal may “pull” away the resources invested in its pursuit, 
undermining goal-commitment, progress, the development of effective means to goal 
attainment, and suppressing affective responses to feedback about goal-progress. In short, 
a concomitance of different goals might tax one’s available resources. In such 
circumstances, the pursuit of one goal might mean sacrificing the others.  
Given the unpleasant possibility of having to give up on some of their goals,  
people may seek “multifinal” means believed to promote their concurrent attainments, 
allowing one to “have one’s cake and eat it too” (Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, 




provide numerous examples of such quest for multifinal means. For instance, laptop 
computers allow people to travel while getting work done, checking our e-mails and 
paying the bills. Driving and “reading” at the same time became possible through audio 
books. With cellular phone in hand, Japanese consumers can purchase from vending 
machines, buy train tickets, order a bowl of noodles, trade stock, bid at online auctions 
and change channels on a TV set.  
 As depicted above, multifinality concerns make a great deal of sense, and 
exemplify the simple rationality of maximizing the returns on one’s investments, or 
increasing the “bang for one’s buck”. What makes this process psychologically 
interesting is the possibility that the multifinality quest may induce instability in one’s 
preferences for means to the same goal, depending on the currently activated goal 
alternatives. The present work aims to elucidate that nature of such a “multifinality quest” 
and to investigate its consequences. The perspective that I adopt emphasizes the cognitive 
aspects of motivational phenomena embodied in the notion of goal systems. First, I will 
place my work in the broader historical context of social psychological theorizing about 
motivation and cognition. I will then present a series of empirical investigations on the 
consequences of multifinality quest in multiple goal pursuit and two of its boundary 
conditions having to do with 1) feasibility of locating multifinal means given the 




I. Motivational Theorizing in Social Psychology 
 
I. 1. Classic Motivational Theorizing in Social Psychology.  
The concepts of goals and motivation have been present in psychological 
theorizing and research throughout the history of psychology as a field of inquiry. Indeed, 
self-regulation has been long recognized as one of the most important aspects of human 
existence. Deciding which goals to pursue and engagement in goal-directed action is a 
fundamental process underlying many of the person’s daily thoughts feeling and 
behaviors . The first half of the 20th century was dominated by Freudian and behaviorist 
models of self-regulation which held respectively that behavior is determined either by 
biological impulses and unconscious conflicts, or by the external environment. In his 
classical study, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud (1920, 1990) portrays human 
behavior as driven by two inherent, conflicting desires, the life drive (Eros) and the death 
drive (Thanatos). By contrast, behaviorists conceived of action as externally motivated. 
Goals were assumed to be approached in terms of incentives for goal directed action. 
Although they never doubted that subjective goals may affect a person’s behavior, the 
behaviorists contended that “motivation” lies outside the individual in the form of 
reinforcements and punishments (Locke & Latham, 2002). As a consequence, the 
behaviorists were less interested in goal-setting, goal representation, or the mechanisms 
underlying the effects of goals on behavior, and were rather focused on the observable 
features of goal-directed behavior, such as persistence, appropriateness, and search 




Modern theoretical perspectives that highlight the need to analyze goal-directed 
actions in relation to people’s subjective goals have their own precursors that reach 
beyond the behaviorism era. James (1890) in his Principles of Psychology included a 
chapter on the will and touched on many key issues of concern to present day goal 
theorists. James defined the phenomena of interest to psychologists as including feelings, 
desires and cognitions and suggested that “the pursuance of future ends and the choice of 
means for their attainment are …the mark and criteria of the presence of mentality in a 
phenomenon” (p. 8). By contrast to the behaviorists, according to James individual’s 
subjective goal is the reference point for goal-directed action rather than a powerful 
incentive in the external environment. The critical question raised by James is whether 
people meet their goals (despite the obstacles), and not whether their actions toward an 
incentive carry features of persistence, appropriateness and searching.  
The impact of subjective goals has been further acknowledged and analyzed by 
McDougall, (1908). He stressed the role of cognition in analyzing the current state and in 
envisioning the event or goal state to be realized. The humanistic movement, in particular 
Rogers (1951) self-theory, explicitly placed the conscious “self” as the most important 
causal agent in goal-directed action. Behavior, according to Rogers is not driven by the 
environment or by nonconscious forces but rather by an active “self” that mediates 
between the environment and behavior.  
The issue of goal-directed behavior played an important role in German will 
psychology as well. For instance, Ach (1935) attempted to establish a scientific analysis 
of the phenomenon of volitional action or willing. Ach introduced the concept of 




as the existence of mental linkages between an anticipated situation and a concrete 
intended behavior. In this conception, a “determining tendency” would urge a person to 
execute an action when encountering the specified situational stimulus.  
Social psychologists have long recognized the power of current goal states to 
determine what situational stimuli will be attended to and what meaning they will have 
for the individual. Kurt Lewin (1935) argued that “a strongly accented goal so transforms 
the situation that practically all objects acquire a reference to this goal” (p. 102). The 
influence of goals and motives on perception was a major theme of the New Look 
research (see Bruner, 1957; Jones and Thibaut, 1958). The perceiver’s current goals and 
physiological needs were considered a primary determinant of the accessibility of 
perceptual categories, and hence of perceptual selectivity and categorization inputs.  
Particularly relevant to modern theorizing about goals is Lewin’s work on goal 
tension systems (Lewin, 1935). In his view, one’s needs (goals) create a tension that 
propels one to action designed to reduce it. The amount of tension varies with the 
strength of the needs and affects the intensity of one’s strivings (goal commitment). If the 
goal is unsatisfied, the tension remains and behavior related to the goal will persist (the 
Zeigarnik effect) until the goal is satisfied or given up. Goals have the property of 
“equifinality”. That is, a goal does not dictate behavior, but rather an end state that could 
be arrived at by adopting a number of different instrumental behaviors (or means) which 
may all substitute for each other in reducing the tension.  
I. 2. Goal concepts in the cognitive era. 
With the beginning of the cognitive revolution in the mid 1960s, the interest in the 




been rather scarce. By contrast, goal concepts have been present often in cognitive 
models of human action. Neisser (1967) concluded that  a current intent or goal is a 
primary determinant of cognition and behavior: “In accounting for the course of thought 
and action, there has been repeated reference to the subject’s motives and 
expectations….To know what the subject will think of next [requires] a detailed 
understanding of what he is trying to do and why.” (p. 304-305).  Newell, Shaw, & 
Simon’s (1958) General problem solver model discussed means-ends relationships and 
depicted a hierarchy of goals and sub-goals, and Miller, Galanter, & Pribram (1960) 
discussed the relation between goals and plans. In addition to such models which 
concentrated mainly on the architecture of goal-directed behavior, other theories such as 
Social Cognitive Theory (e.g. Bandura, 1997) and Goal Setting Theory (Locke & Latham 
(1990; 2002) attempted to analyze the motivational properties of goals such as value and 
expectancy of attainment and to determine the impact of such variables on the 
expenditure of effort toward goal pursuit.  
Nonetheless, the various cognitive models had little to say about what kinds of 
goals people have, how goals and goal systems develop on a moment-to-moment basis 
and how they are integrated with other aspects of human behavior. According to Bargh 
(1990, p. 99) “typically, it is the executive process that selects the current goals and 
chooses among available alternative actions.” But questions as to what or who constitutes 
this “executive process” remained largely unanswered. Neisser (1967) referred to this 
failure of different models of human action and cognition to specify what determines 
what particular goal will be in place at a particular point in time as the “problem of the 




variable in models of cognition and action in many analyses, the organism was portrayed 
as a spectator rather than as a participant, as if, “people only collect maps, but never go to 
trips” (Pervin, 1989).  
I. 3. Motivation vs. cognition.  
Unlike the attention that cognitive psychology accorded to goal-directed action 
and goal constructs, in social psychology motivation was often contrasted to cognition. 
Thus, for example, the dissonance vs. self-perception debate (Bem, 1972) pitted 
motivational (i. e. dissonance) versus cognitive (i. e., self-perception) explanations of 
attitude change phenomena. Similarly, motivational explanation of biased causal 
attributions in terms of ego-defensive tendencies (cf. Kelly, 1972) was contrasted with a 
purely cognitive explanation in terms of expectancies (Miller & Ross, 1975).  
I. 4. The separatist program.  
A different approach assumed that motivation and cognition fulfill “separate” 
functions in different information processing. Thus, in major social psychological models 
of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Chen & Chaiken, 1999), judgment, or impression 
formation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990, Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), distinct 
functions were assigned to motivational and cognitive variables. From this perspective, 
different types or degrees of motivational involvement affect the extent and direction of 
ongoing information processing. For instance, high processing motivation is associated 
with extensive processing of message arguments whereas low processing motivation is 
associated with brief processing of “peripheral” or heuristic cues (Petty & Cacioppo, 




Beyond its separation from cognition, motivation has been often treated statically 
in social psychology research. In other words, social psychological theories assumed the 
presence of a given need or motive (e.g. the need for cognitive consistency) and 
addressed its consequences but they didn’t dwell much on conditions for the appearance 
and disappearance of the motivational state. Motivation theories have taken as a central 
concern the role of specific human needs (Maslow, 1970; Deci & Ryan, 1985) and 
differences in goal-directed behavior and their consequences were explained in terms of 
specific behaviors that individuals set for themselves. Specifically, individuals were 
classified as if in a fixed motivational state with identifiable properties and differences in 
the specific content of that state (were expected to affect person’s behavior (Gollwitzer & 
Moskowitz, 1996). Thus, individuals were considered to have either a high or a low need 
for closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1998), a high or a low 
need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), “learning” or “performance” goals (Dweck, 
1991), goals with a positive vs. negative outcome focus (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & 
Hymes, 1994), “intrinsic” (autonomy, competence) vs. extrinsic” (money) goals (Deci & 
Ryan, 1991), or “high-level” (abstract) goal vs. “low-level” concrete goals (Emmonos, 
1991, 1996). These different types of goals were assumed to systematically impact 
various relevant phenomena including information processing, performance, creativity, 
and overall well-being and satisfaction (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996).  
I. 5. The New Look approach in motivation  
Having set a goal is just the first step toward goal attainment. Goal pursuit 
includes a manifold set of activities. Initiating goal-directed actions and bringing them 




appropriate means), ward off distractions, bypass barriers, compensate for failures and 
shortcomings, and negotiate conflicts. Often, it may be difficult to sustain a focused 
pursuit on a given goal. Our wishes, interests, and desires are rarely very steady or 
constant. Often they fluctuate from one moment to the next as we succumb to a variety of 
distractions, temptations, and digressions. Rather than relentlessly keeping to the task at 
hand we often daydream, ruminate, or get otherwise distracted and our shifting moods 
and emotional states often track our changing motivational conditions. 
Recently, social psychologists realized that an insight into such motivational 
dynamics may be gained if we abandon the separateness assumption of the “motivation” 
versus “cognition” program. The last seventeen years of motivational research, dating 
back to John Bargh’s Automotive chapter of 1990, were characterized by a fresh, 
cognitive look into motivation. The “New Look in Motivation” recognized that 
motivational constructs are cognitively represented. In a sense, the New Look in 
Motivation mirrored the New Look in Perception of the late 1940s and the 1950s. 
Whereas the New Look in Perception was about how cognition is colored by motivation 
(Bruner, 1951) the New Look in Motivation was about how motivation is colored by 
cognition, or, better yet, about motivation as (a kind of) cognition. Of greatest 
importance, the “New Look” highlights motivational dynamism and flux as persons move 
through their environments and react to them (Kruglanski & Kőpetz, in press (a)).  
Central to the New Look approach in motivation is the notion that goal constitutes 
a cognitive representation of a desired endpoint, and that such a representation impacts 
evaluations, emotions, and behaviors (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). Aspects of this 




Bargh, 1990; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Sorrentino & 
Higgins, 1986). The definition of goals as knowledge structures (Kruglanski, 1996) 
implies that goal concepts are governed by the same principles that apply to other 
cognitive structures as well (that is, to categories, concepts, judgments, or opinions). 
According to this notion, just like other cognitive constructs goals can be activated, or 
primed by various stimuli (retrieval cues). For instance, semantic associates may activate 
a goal, (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Bargh et al., 2001), specific person concepts (e. g. 
mother, father, friend) who have a given goal for an individual may also activate it (Shah, 
2003a, 2003b; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003). Priming by specific persons who have a given 
goal for themselves may activate it in others, thus producing a goal contagion (Aarts, 
Gollwitzer & Hassin, 2004). A means may activate the corresponding goal in a bottom up 
fashion (Berkowitz & LePage, 1967; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). An opportunity to 
pursue a goal may activate it (Shah and Kruglanski, 2003).  
Once they have been automatically activated, goals are automatically pursued. 
This was presumed possible because goals, just like other cognitive constructs, are 
cognitively associated with other constructs such as their corresponding means of 
attainment. Hence, the activation of goals is spread intra-systemically to their 
corresponding behavioral plans (Bargh, 1990; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Aarts, 
Dijksterhuis, & De Vries, 2001; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) 
stirring individuals to action. Furthermore, similar to other cognitive constructs, goals too 
are constrained by limited attentional resources, such that the activation of a given goal 
may pull resources away from another goal (for a review see Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; 




Much of the new research on goals (for discussion see Kruglanski & Kőpetz, in 
press(b)) explored the properties of goals by demonstrating that various cognitive 
processes (knowledge activation, spreading activation, unconscious activity) apply also to 
goal related phenomena. Typically, the explicit focus of that work was on implementing a 
given cognitive manipulation such as supraliminal or subliminal priming and looking at 
its effect on various goal related outcomes, such as action, performance, positive or 
negative affect engendered by goal progress or lack of progress respectively, etc. In that 
line of work, the goal related outcomes were often based on plausible intuitive 
assumptions rather than on systematic analysis. For instance, in research where a goal 
was primed and an activity was observed (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh et al., 
2001; Chartrand and Bargh, 1996) the intuitive assumption was that goals automatically 
lead to associated activities. In research on emotional transfer (Fishbach et al., 2004) the 
assumption was that goals are invested with positive affect that may be transmitted to the 
means, and that is diffused and released once the goal in question is attained (Fergusson 
& Bargh, 2004).  
I. 6. The Goal Systems theory.  
Inspired by the New Look movement, goal-systems theory developed by 
Kruglanski, Shah and others (Kruglanski, et al. 2002) proposed a systematic analysis of 
the dynamic of goal-directed behavior. Rather that approaching goals in isolation, goal 
systems theory assumes that our wishes, interests and desires often fluctuate from one 
moment to the next affecting our thoughts and actions. Moreover, human lives are often 
lived in considerable “motivational business” in which different goals, sub-goals and 




behavior of goal systems defined as mental representations of motivational networks 
composed of interconnected goals and means. A possible goal system in depicted in 
Figure 1.  
Motivational phenomena such as goal commitment, means choice, management 
of goal conflict are approached as a joint function of cognitive principles (that the goal 
systems share with other cognitive structures) as they apply to unique motivational 
concepts such as goals and means. 
 
 
Figure 1. A system of goals and means (Reproduced after Kruglanski et al., 2002) 
 
The theory recognizes that human action is goal-driven, in that it represents the 
striving to attain specific desirable objectives. Decision to pursue a goal involves 
considerations of goal value and its expectancy of attainment which define subjective 
utility (Atkinson, 1964). Subjective utility determines goal commitment or the degree to 
Subgoal 2 Subgoal 1 Subgoal 3 






which the individual is determined to pursue specific objectives which, in turn, may 
express themselves in the persistence of efforts toward goal attainment including the 
choice of appropriate means and the management of goal conflicts. Subjective utility 
considerations may also drive the choice of appropriate means. All else being equal, at 
any given moment, the means to be chosen are those which promise the greatest 
expectancy of attainment. Often, the means to be chosen are those means that in addition 
to a focal goal promise to attain additional active goals as well, hence being multifinal. 
The number of goals linked to a given means define the multifinality set captured by the 









Figure 2 Multifinality configuration (Reproduced after Kruglanski et al., 2002) 
 
Whereas goal pursuit has its own endogenous determinants related to 
considerations of expectancy and value, it is also determined by the exogenous cognitive 
conditions of a given goal system which affect the nature and values of theses 
endogenous factors. Such cognitive factors are structural and allocational. Thus, (1) goals 
like other mental representations are associatively linked to other constructs, such as their 





means of attainment, and other goals and (2) such associative links can be facilitative or 
inhibitory; 3) goal pursuit is resource-dependent; the greater the investment of resources 
in the pursuit of a certain goal, the less resources would be available for alternative goals 
or means. For instance, the mere presence of “Chocolatier” magazine may facilitate the 
activation of the goal of “eating” but it may also remind people that they should go on a 
diet (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). In such instances, successful goal pursuit 
may involve the inhibition of the eating temptation such that one can efficiently 
concentrate resources on the pursuit of the more committed goal of dieting.   
The present work would like to consider how these goal systemic notions relate to 
the impact that additional goals may have on individual’s ability of choosing effective 





II. Multiple goal pursuit and the notion of multifinality 
 
II. 1. The pursuit of multiple goals and goal conflict.  
The possibility that goals are automatically activated by a variety of stimuli that 
people may naturally encounter, including semantic stimuli, objects, relationship 
partners, and strangers suggests that in typical, rich and complex social environments the 
coactivation of simultaneous goals seems inevitable. In addition, people may consciously 
choose to pursue several goals simultaneously (e. g. career and family). Indeed, 
psychologists have long acknowledged the idea of multiplicity in human action. Neisser 
(1967) observed that “almost all human activity, including human thinking, serves not 
one, but a multiplicity of motives at the same time” (p. 195). Similarly, Atkinson & 
Birch’s (1970) theorizing on the dynamics of action, assume that at any given point many 
different action tendencies coexist. Such situations in which multiple desirable goals may 
be present at the same time have been traditionally approached in terms of goal conflict 
whose resolution required a choice. In the words of Emmons, King, & Sheldon (1993), 
“Implicit in self-regulated activity…..is conflict” (p. 528).  
The existence of conflicting desires or drives in individuals has been addressed in 
psychology beginning with William James’ (1890) discussion of the battle between 
impulsions and inhibitions and continuing through the work of Freud (1923/1962) in his 
classic treatment of the struggle between ego and id. Later research inspired by the 
behaviorist approach, also recognized the paramount role played by conflict as embodied 




situation where the individual is confronted with a choice between two equally desirable 
alternatives as an “approach-approach” competition. In his view, as soon as the response 
of approaching one goal is initiated, it produces effects which either increase their own 
strength or decreases that of competitors. In social psychology, Kurt Lewin is widely 
credited with first highlighting the effect of conflicting forces or tension systems on 
behavior (e. g. Lewin, 1951; see Ross & Nisbett, 1991). In this sense, Lewin talks about 
the need to exercise choice when the person is located between two positive or negative 
valences that are mutually exclusive. More recently, Emmons and King (1988) showed 
that conflicting goals tend to produce rumination rather than action, and in consequence, 
the person fails to make progress toward any of the conflicted objectives. Similarly, Van 
Hook and Higgins (1988) noted that self-regulatory difficulties often arise from internal 
conflicts between one’s divergent standards which make difficult the assessment of 
progress toward one’s goals.  
II. 2. Goal conflict and the competition for limited resources.  
The underlying assumption of the goal research outlined above is that 
simultaneously activated goals compete for limited motivational resources. According to 
this view, pursuit of a given goal inevitably pulls resources away from other pursuits. 
Consistent with this notion are findings indicating that effective goal-pursuit decreases as 
a function of fatigue, concurrent activity, negative affect, or immediate and prior efforts, 
all of which may considerably tax and deplete individual’s cognitive resources 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). 
For instance, participants asked to control their emotional responses to an upsetting 




participants who suppressed forbidden thoughts were subsequently less likely to persist in 
solving anagrams. Moreover, recent results indicate that acts of self-control whereby 
people protect their high important goals (e. g. dieting) from interference with low-
important goals (e. g. indulging one’s craving for a tasty but fattening piece of cake) 
require a certain amount of glucose to operate unimpaired. A single act of self-control 
causes glucose to drop below optimal levels, thereby impairing subsequent attempts at 
self-control (Gailliot, Baumeister et al., 2007).  
Along these lines, it has been found in several studies (Shah and Kruglanski, 
2002) that introducing an alternative goal undermines participants’ commitment to a 
focal goal, hampers progress toward that goal, hinders the development of effective 
means for goal-pursuit, and dampens participants’ emotional responses to positive and 
negative feedback about goal progress. In one of Shah and Kruglanski’s (2002) studies, 
participants expected to perform two consecutive tasks, the first of which consisted of 
anagram solution. While working toward this focal goal participants were subliminally 
primed with the second task they expected to perform later (that operationally defined the 
“alternative” goal) or, with a control-phrase. Commitment to the focal goal was assessed 
through persistence on the first task, performance success, and extent of affective 
reactivity to success and failure feedback. These measures of commitment showed 
substantial decline in the alternative goal-priming (versus control) condition. In other 
words, the activation of alternative goals may pull away attentional resources from the 




II. 3. Managing multiple goals 
 Goal choice. Given the detrimental effects that the presence of alternative goals 
may have on the pursuit of a focal goal, the question is then how people deal with their 
multiple pursuits? Recent theorizing about multiple goal pursuit suggests that in the face 
of numerous competing pursuits a person needs to prioritize them and resolve goal 
conflict in order to ensure the successful attainment of as many goals as possible (Cantor 
& Langston, 1989; Carver, 2004; Emmonos & King, 1988; Higgins, 1997; Shah, 2005; 
Simon, 1967). One line of research has advanced the idea that when confronted with 
multiple concerns at the same time, people do not “optimize” their performance on any of 
them, but rather “satisfice” (Carver, 2004, p. 23; Simon, 1953) or do “a good enough job 
on each concern to deal with it satisfactorily” and then move along. Along these lines, 
Herbert Simon (1967) acknowledged that an entity that has many goals needs a way to 
rank them in order of importance and requires a mechanism for changing the rankings as 
necessary.  
In Simon’s view, individuals act according to a hierarchy of goals whereby 
distinct goals may be queued and handled within individual time allocations. However, 
given the fact that the environment places important and sometimes severe time 
constraints, upon goal pursuit, one needs to respond to interruptions and imperative 
demands (e. g. hunger, fear, noticing motion) unrelated to the current goal. Moreover, 
even when not necessarily interrupted, human behavior needs to be responsive not to just 
one, but a multiplicity of goals. For instance, a speaker not only attends the content of 
what he is saying, but also responds to the feedback he gets from the facial expressions, 




seeking to please, to impress, or to earn appreciation. Simon proposes that in such 
instances emotions are calls for reprioritization. He suggests that emotion arising with 
respect to an additional goal that may be activated outside of awareness eventually 
induces people to interrupt their current behavior and give the newly activated goal a 
higher priority. A similar emotional-based mechanism that allows people to shift from 
one current pursuit to another has been proposed by Carver (2003, 2004). He argues that 
given the fact that people have multiple concerns at the same time, positive emotion 
associated with goal pursuit may signal progress and may induce the tendency to coast 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Frijda, 1994) or to “pull back temporarily the resources 
devoted” to that goal (p. 22). Such tendency to coast facilitates the shift of attention and 
effort to other behavioral domains allowing one to maintain a satisfactory standing with 
regard to multiple goals and to be able to handle unforeseen demands and opportunities.  
Kuhl (1983, 1984) suggested a different mechanism responsible for the 
management of multiple goals (for a recent review see Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). He 
proposed that for a goal-directed action to occur, the current guiding, or focal, goal has to 
be shielded from competing goals (e. g. the goal of getting to class in time from the goal 
of making up the bed in the morning). He terms this shielding mechanism action control 
and differentiates possible control strategies involved in attention control, emotional 
control, environmental control, etc.  Shah, Friedman and Kruglanski (2003) further 
investigated goal shielding and found that activation of a given focal goal results in an 
inhibition of alternative goals reflected in the slowing down of lexical decision times to 
such goals. For instance, when a goal (versus a control word) served as a prime this 




attesting to their inhibition. In Shah and Kruglanski’s (2003) research the magnitude of 
such inhibition was positively related to participants' commitment to the focal goal they 
were currently pursuing.  
Although the ability to inhibit competing alternatives to a focal goal confers clear 
self-regulatory advantages because it allows one to concentrate resources on the current 
pursuit and, hence, efficiently pursue one’s goals, such mechanism may prove inefficient 
in those situations where the overall commitment to the currently activated goal is 
appreciably lower than commitment to alternative goals. This may be the case in some 
common situations wherein momentary allurements threaten to thwart the attainment of 
long-important goals. In such circumstances inhibiting the latter and succumbing to 
temptations may be counteradaptive. The opposite pattern would make much more self-
regulatory sense—namely, the activation (rather than inhibition) of higher priority goals 
on confrontation of a temptation. Indeed, Fishbach et. al. (2003) showed that successful 
self-regulators may have learned to spontaneously activate (rather than inhibit) higher 
priority goals when confronted with temptations. In parallel, inhibitory links may develop 
between the representations of the goals and their pertinent temptations. Such asymmetric 
pattern of associations between short term motives (temptations) and the overriding goals 
with which they interfere allows participants to form self-control-related behavior 
intentions and to actually make behavioral choices consistent with their high-importance 
goals.  
As suggested by research described above, when individuals simultaneously hold 
multiple goals, effective self-regulation implies the need to exercise a choice (1) either by 




alternatives or (2) by intermittently pursuing several potentially incongruent goals. What 
determines whether one strategy or the other is preferred? Recent research suggests that 
one relevant factor in this connection may be the person’s interpretation of the initial 
action as congruent with one of the goals (Dhar & Simonson, 1999; Fishbach & Dhar, 
2005; Fishbach, Dhar & Zhang, 2006). If such action is interpreted as a strong 
commitment toward the respective goal it motivates one to engage in similar 
complementary actions and to inhibit any competing goals. On the other hand, if an initial 
action toward a goal is perceived as progress toward that respective goal and it may 
determine the person to “relax” his or her efforts toward that goal and “switch” to another 
competing pursuits. In line with this theorizing, Fishbach and Dhar (2005) showed that 
when initial academic success was interpreted as indicating greater commitment to 
academic goals, students were subsequently interested in pursuing additional academic 
tasks and they were less interested in pursuing other leisure activities. However, when the 
same level of academic performance was interpreted as progress toward their academic 
goal, students’ interest in pursuing additional academic tasks decreased significantly 
whereas their interests in leisure activities increased.  
The quest for multifinal means. As depicted above, the presence of alternative 
goals often implies the need to exercise goal choice. Indeed, the inter-goal effects 
discussed above entailed a choice reflected in people pursuing one goal at a time while 
alternative goals are inhibited or postponed. However the possibility of giving up some of 
their goals (even if momentarily) may have negative consequences particularly when the 
conflicting goals represent enduring self-defining goals (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), 




(1988) observed that conflict between personal strivings (i. e. power and intimacy goals) 
is often associated with poor well-being as reflected in negative affect as well as in 
physical symptomatology. Emmons (1996) suggests that such negative effects of conflict 
may be reversed through a creative integration of separate goal strivings. Similarly, 
Cantor and Fleeson (1991, 1994) suggest that perceived conflict between goals and its 
negative consequences may be reduced by recruiting one goal in the service of the other. 
For instance, one may “balance” the goal of doing well academically with other social 
goals by turning to close others for encouragements and reassurance when faced with 
obstacles and difficulties in the academic life.  
Given the unpalatable possibility of having to give up on some of their goals, 
people may seek alternative strategies to deal with multiple goals. For instance, Dhar and 
his collaborators (Dhar & Simonson, 1999; Khan & Dhar, 2007) suggested that when 
confronted with two goals such as pleasure and good health, people may attempt to 
balance their choice of means to satisfy the goals (i. e. order a tasty but unhealthy 
appetizer followed by a healthy entrée). In a similar vein, research on the compromise 
effect (Simonson, 1989) demonstrated a general preference for choice alternatives that 
partially meet several goals at once rather than ones that fully meet a single goal. In line 
with this finding I propose that when confronted with multiple goals people may seek 
“multifinal” means believed to promote their concurrent attainment, and thus allow one 
to “have the  cake and eat it too” (Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, & 
Sleeth-Keppler, 2002). In other words, if in addition to the focal goal the individual is 
interested in pursuing other goals as well, the means to be chosen might often be the ones 




as well. It is important in this context to distinguish between “focal” goals that the 
individual is explicitly pursuing and “background” goals that are secondary and of which 
presence he/she may not be even consciously aware. My present purpose is to elucidate 
that nature of such a “multifinality quest” and to investigate its consequences and 
boundary conditions.  
Multifinality concerns often affect people’s everyday choices. Consider the 
purchase of a car. Typically, it represents a multidimensional decision process involving 
a number of considerations. Though one’s primary purpose might be “transportation”, 
other parameters (e.g., of price, design, performance, repair record, safety) typically enter 
the picture as well. Furthermore, it seems plausible that the more numerous one’s 
requirements (e.g., goals a car purchase is intended to meet), the more difficult, and 
tortured the choice (i. e. the more “picky” and “demanding” one’s behavior as a chooser). 
Simply, increasing the number of requirements depletes the set of satisfactory options, 
thus elevating the difficulty of the search (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998; Dhar, 1996; 
Dhar & Simonson, 1999; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1999; 
Tversky & Shafir, 1992). For instance, while all functioning cars provide transportation, 
somewhat fewer (though still quite a few) do so for an affordable price, fewer yet also 
please one’s aesthetic tastes, fewer offer safety and a stellar repair record, etc.  
As just depicted, multifinality concerns make a great deal of sense, and exemplify 
the simple rationality of maximizing the returns on one’s investments, or increasing the 
“bang for one’s buck.” What makes this process psychologically interesting is the 
possibility that the multifinality quest may alter one’s preferences for means to the same 




activated by shifting environmental stimuli (Bargh, 1990; Bargh et al., 2001; Ferguson & 
Bargh, 2004; but see Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Kruglanski & Kőpetz, in press (a), (b) 
for reviews) this may effect an intriguing instability in the kinds and number of means 






III. The present Theory 
 
III. 1. Multifinality Quest and Means’ Acceptability 
The possibility that people’s choices may be driven by multifinality constraints 
casts a novel light on an enigmatic finding by Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) (based on 
Wilson & Nisbett’s (1978) research). In this study, passersby at a department store chose 
among four (and, unbeknownst to the participants, identical) pairs of nylon stockings, or 
four (identical) night gowns, the item of the highest quality. A strong position effect 
obtained such that the two rightward objects in the array were heavily over-chosen. Of 
interest, participants seemed entirely unaware of their bias. Instead, they justified their 
choices exclusively in terms of the focal goal of selecting the highest quality object in the 
array. Thus, whatever might have pushed their choices rightward seems to have operated 
outside these individuals’ cognizance.  
The notion of multifinality offers a possible insight into this puzzling 
phenomenon. From this perspective, beyond their assigned goal of making a reasonable 
choice, Wilson and Nisbett’s (1978) participants, may have had another pressing goal, 
that of reaching quick closure and getting on with their shopping, after dutifully 
inspecting the entire array of stockings. Whereas the former, focal, goal was highly 
explicit and conscious, the latter goal may have been implicit, and to have operated in the 
“background”, largely outside participants’ awareness.  
Given that the scanning habit within the American culture shows a distinct left to 




and reaching quick closure) would have been satisfied to by the rightward objects in the 
array, the last ones to be inspected following an initial, obligatory, sweep. In present 
terminology then, the rightward objects would have been more multifinal than their 
preceding, left lying, alternatives. Thus, multifinality might have constituted a major 
reason why Wilson and Nisbett’s (1978) participants ended up over-choosing the 
rightward objects and exhibiting the intriguing position effect of which they were, 
apparently, unaware.  
Chun, Kruglanski, Sleeth-Keppler & Friedman (2005, Study 1) conceptually 
replicated Wilson and Nisbett’s (1978) research with one modification. Whereas 
participants’ “focal goal” was kept constant, their presumptive “background goal” of 
closure was systematically manipulated via time pressure (versus accuracy) instructions 
(Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Consistent with the multifinality analysis, the rightward 
bias was replicated in the time-pressure condition and was eliminated in the accuracy 
condition. Chun et al’s (2005) subsequent studies furnished additional evidence for 
multifinality quest using the background goals of identifying versus disidentifying with 
one’s university and identifying versus disidentifying with the U.S. (Kruglanski & 
Kőpetz, in press (a), (b)).  
III. 2. The core hypothesis: Mutifinality constraints effect 
Given that a multifinality quest may take place, it is of interest to consider what 
effect this may have on goal pursuit. The major notion explored in the present research is 
that a multifinality consideration would narrow the set of means to a focal goal by 
inducing a preference for multifinal means, that is, means assumed to be instrumental 




a subset of the total number of means to the focal goal that one could envisage (see 
Figure 3). Restricting one’s attention to those particular means should thus reduce the 
number of means to the focal goal that one would find acceptable. This implies that the 
number and kind of means to a given focal goal may change significantly as a 
consequence of events that happened to activate in the individual’s mind some alternative 
pressing objectives. I label this the multifnality constraints effect, and investigate it 










Figure 3 The multifinality constraints effect 
 
III. 3 The boundary conditions of the multifinality constraints effect  
 Feasibility of generating multifinal means. The multifinality constraints effect 
may be subject to two boundary conditions. One relates to feasibility of generating 
multifinal means given the nature of the relationship between the focal and the alternative 
Focal Goal Background 
Goal 




goals. Some focal and alternative goals may appear to share numerous common means. 
This should increase the feasibility of identifying multifinal means and reduce the extent 
to which the multifinality quest would occasion a reduction in the set of means to the 
focal goal. For instance, whereas one might find it easy to think of multiple ways to attain 
simultaneously the goals of “loosing weight” and “having a good figure” (i.e. “choosing a 
balanced diet”, “exercising regularly”), it may be rather difficult to envisage a way to “do 
well in school” and “ be a world class athlete” at the same time.  
Foregoing considerations suggest a curvilinear relation between perceived 
feasibility of finding multifinal means and the degree to which alternative goals would 
constrain the size of the set of means to the focal goal (depicted in Figure 4). Where 
feasibility of finding multifinal means is either very high or very low (as compared to it 
being intermediate) constraints should be minimal: When feasibility is high, finding 
multifinal means should be easy, necessitating no appreciable reduction in the number of 
means to the focal goal. On other hand, when feasibility is very low individuals may give 
up on the very attempts at finding multifinal means. Instead, they may opt for exercising 
goal-choice by inhibiting the alternative goal and limiting their concerns to the focal goal 
at hand. In light of the foregoing considerations, the multifinality constraints effect 
should be more pronounced in an intermediate feasibility condition than in the very high 
or very low feasibility conditions. The two latter conditions aren’t similar in all respects, 
however, as only in the low (but not in the high) feasibility condition should absence of 
the multifinality constraints effect be accompanied by goal-choice manifested, e.g. by an 
inhibition of the alternative goal. Moreover, if the forgoing effects are driven by a quest 




the high and intermediate feasibility conditions, but not in the low feasibility condition 




Figure 4 The relationship between multifinality constraints effect and the number and 
instrumentality of the means 
 
Commitment to the focal goal. The second boundary condition on the multifinality 
constraint effect may have to do with the degree of commitment to the focal goal 
(Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; Emmons, 1986; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Oettingen, 
Pak, & Schnetter, 2001). Goal commitment has been conceived in terms of a strong sense 
of determination, the willingness to invest effort, impatient striving (tenacity) toward goal 
attainment (Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987; Novacek & Lazarus, 1990; Brunstein, 1993). 
According to Locke and Latham (2002; p. 707), “two key factors facilitating goal 
commitment are (a) factors that make goal attainment important to people, including the 
importance of the outcomes they expect as a results of working to attain a goal, and (b) 
their belief that they can attain the goal.” According to this conceptualization several 




Oettingen et al. (2001) assessed participants’ level of goal commitment based on the 
extent to which participants formulated specific plans to attain the goal, took on 
responsibility and felt energized as well as through the immediacy of initiating action 
toward the goal, task persistence and actual performance. Similarly, Shah et al. (2003) 
approached commitment in terms of goal importance and tenacity of goal pursuit as 
reflected in task persistence. They demonstrated that increased commitment to the focal 
goal may produce its shielding via an inhibition of the alternate goals. Such inhibition 
should reduce the degree to which the alternative goals would have impact and constrain 
the means to the focal goal. Consistent with previous research, in the present work, I 
assume that increased commitment to the focal goal defined as determination or 
willingness to pursue that specific goal should liberate one from taking the alternative 
goals into account, hence removing the necessity to search for multifinal means, and 
allowing a full suite of means to the focal goal to be judged as acceptable.  
In summary, I have postulated that the simultaneous presence of several goals 
may induce a quest for multifinal means affording the joint pursuit of the individual’s co-
active objectives. Multifinal means typically constitute a subset of the full array of means 
to a focal goal one might consider. Accordingly, activating additional goals should 
narrow the set of acceptable means to a focal objective. Moreover, the quest for 
“multifinal” means should constrain the type of acceptable “focal” means to ones that 
benefit the active alternative goals as well. This effect should be especially strong when 
the alternative and the focal goals are assumed to have only a few (but not many, or no) 
means in common.  Finally, because increasing commitment to the focal goal may inhibit 




“multifinality” constraints allowing the set of means to the focal goal to maintain its 




The present research 
 
I explored these notions in three separate studies. Study 1 constituted a 
preliminary investigation designed to indicate whether a subtle reminder of goal-
alternatives would narrow the focal set of means for a current goal (of “having lunch”) to 
means that would save time and hence allow those alternatives to be pursued. Study 2 
explored the notion that restriction in the number of acceptable means would be reduced 
if the focal and alternative goals were perceived as potentially served by the same 
(multifinal) means. Study 3 manipulated commitment to the focal goal (of “eating”) and 
investigated the hypothesis that this would inhibit the alternative goal (of “healthy diet”), 
and hence relax its multifinality constraints, which should increase the set-size of 




 Study 1 constituted a preliminary investigation designed to test the hypothesis that 
activation of alternative goals would reduce the number of means considered as 
acceptable for pursuit of a given focal goal. As argued earlier, the notion of mutifinality 
quest implies such a reduction, based on the rationale that only a subset of otherwise 
acceptable means would satisfy the multifinality constraints imposed by the alternative 





Participants. Thirty eight University of Maryland students were approached at the 
Student Union in College Park during the lunch hour and were asked to fill out a survey 
on “Students’ eating habits.” Because women are typically more concerned with weight 
and dieting than men (Rozin, Bauer, & Catanese, 2003) and are more likely than men to 
be dieters or “restrained eaters” (Hawkins, Turell, and Jackson 1983; Ferraro, Shiv, & 
Bettman, 2005) I decided to restrict the sample to male participants. I reasoned that 
female participants may have chronic diet-related concerns (goals) that may override the 
importance of many of their daily activities and, therefore, drive the selection of foods 
despite the presence of other active goals. All the participants were volunteers and 
unsurprisingly, they all reported the goal of getting lunch as reason for being at the 
Student Union at that particular time. Accordingly, I identified ‘getting lunch’ as 
participants’ focal goal. 
Food pre-testing. I conducted an extensive pre-testing of students’ food 
preferences and the availability of such foods at the campus food court in order to 
identify foods that are highly desirable and readily available for students. Specifically, I 
asked forty-nine University of Maryland students, during lunch time (1PM-2PM), to list 
the foods they wanted for lunch and to rate how easily (1 =  not easily at all; 9 = very 
easily) and how quickly (1 = not quickly at all; 9 = very quickly) they could get them at 
the food court in the Student Union. In response, participants listed 28 distinct food 
categories (e.g., pizza, pasta, salad, sushi, pancakes, etc.). Because the ratings of ease and 
quickness were highly correlated for each of the foods (rs ranging from .73 to .94, p < 




the highest on the easiness/quickness scale (above 5 on the 1 to 9 scale) to represent the 
“easy to get” foods and the 10 foods that scored the lowest (below 3.5 on the 1 to 9 
scale) to represent the “hard to get” foods. The list of foods is presented in appendix A.  
Procedure. The study employed a 2 (goals: completed vs. uncompleted) × 2 
(foods: easy vs. hard to get) mixed design, with goals varying between subjects and foods 
varying within subjects. I activated participants’ alternative goals by asking them in one 
condition to list three activities they had planned for the rest of that day. This 
operationally defined the uncompleted goals condition. In the completed goals condition, 
participants were asked to list three activities that they had already accomplished that 
day. I assumed that the latter goals would have lost their driving potential, or in Lewinian 
terms, would have had their “tension-system” drained. Participants in both conditions 
listed similar activities such as “going to class/had a class” ”exercising in the gym/went 
to the gym,” “washing my car/drove to school” “studying for a quiz/went to the library.” 
Participants were then asked to choose the foods they desired for lunch from a list of 20 
foods. These foods were pre-tested such that 10 of them were generally readily available 
at the food court where I ran the study (e. g. Chinese food, tacos, fries) whereas the 
remaining 10 were foods considered to be unavailable at the food court, though available 
at other campus locations (e.g., salmon, macaroni and cheese, crab cakes). I assumed that 
“easy to get” foods are multifinal in that choosing them will help participants to fulfill 
their focal goal (of having lunch) and also to save time for alternative goals they had 




Results and Discussion 
The number of foods each participant selected as desirable was analyzed as a 
function of goals (completed vs. uncompleted goals) and type of foods (easy to get vs. 
hard to get foods). An ANOVA of this variable yielded a significant main effect of goals 
(F(1, 35) = 8.75, p < 0.01). Participants who were reminded of their uncompleted goals 
selected fewer foods (means) than their counterparts who were reminded of their already 
completed goals. Moreover, as attested by the significant interaction effect between goals 
and food type ((F(1, 35) = 5.15, p < .05)), participants in the uncompleted goals condition 
were also more selective. Specifically, they chose a higher number of easy vs. hard to get 
foods (M = 3.57 vs. M = 1.57, t(18) = 3.77, p < .01). By contrast, participants in the 
completed goals condition in did not show a significant preference for easy to get foods 
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Figure 5 Number of “easy to get foods” vs. “hard to get foods” selected as means to the focal goal of 
“having lunch” as a function of alternative goals prime (Study 1) 
 
Results of Study 1 support the basic prediction that the presence of alternative 




allow the pursuit of other active goals: Participants whose focal goal was to get lunch, 
showed a interest in fewer foods when they were reminded of other activities they had 
planned for the day than when they were reminded about activities they had already 
accomplished that day. Furthermore, when participants thought about their uncompleted 
(vs. completed) goals, participants showed a stronger preference for “easy” to get foods 
than for “hard” to get foods. The latter preference seems to reflect a search for a 
multifinal solution that would enable participants to attain their focal goal (that is, to have 
lunch) while leaving time also for alternative goals they intended to accomplish.  
As participants were assigned randomly to the completed and uncompleted goals 
conditions, they likely had a similar number of future goals for the day. Objectively then, 
participants in both conditions should have been equally “busy.” The difference between 
them resided in the fact that in the uncompleted (but not in the completed) condition 
participants had their impending goals activated. This presumably instigated participants’ 
quest for multifinal means, producing the multifinality constraint effect. 
In general, the multifinality constraint effect may serve an important self-
regulatory function as it assures a better overall outcome (a bigger “bang for one’s 
(investment) buck” in which neither goal alternative is abandoned. However, its 
appearance is subject may be subject to a number of boundary conditions. One such 
condition pertains to feasibility of identifying multifinal means for goals that happen to 
be active at the time. The next study was designed to investigate this particular moderator 







This study investigates the feasibility of finding multifinal means as a possible  
boundary condition for the multifinality constraint effect. Up to a point, feasibility of 
finding multifinal means should be inversely related to the multifinality constraints 
effect: The easier it should be to find multifinal means, the lesser should be the reduction 
in the number of focal means occasioned by presence of the alternative goal. In other 
words, as one moves from the high to intermediate feasibility (of finding common means) 
the relation between feasibility and the multifinality constraint effect should be negative.  
As reasoned earlier, however, if the focal and the alternative goal appeared to 
share no common means whatsoever, the individual might view the multifinality quest as 
futile. In such a circumstance, instead of attempting to identify common means the 
individual might opt to exercise goal choice by inhibiting the alternative goal, and 
directing one’s exclusive attention to the focal goal (Shah, Friedman & Kruglanski, 
2003). Such a process should liberate the individual from the impact of the alternative 
goal, eliminating the multifinality constraint effect. In other words, in the segment of the 
feasibility continuum ranging from the somewhat feasible to the completely unfeasible, 
multifinality constraint effect should vary positively with feasibility. Thus, the number of 
acceptable means to the focal goal should be less in the somewhat feasible condition, 
when the focal and alternative goals are seen as somewhat related, than in the completely 
unfeasible condition. In summary then, the relation between feasibility/goal relatedness 




between feasibility/relatedness up to a point beyond which this relation should become 
positive.  
In the present study I manipulated the feasibility of finding focal means by 
subliminally priming an alternative goal that varied in the number of means it shared with 
the focal goal. In the high feasibility condition this number was high, in the moderate 
feasibility condition it was intermediate and in the low feasibility condition it was low. I 
subsequently assessed the number of means (activities) that participants chose with 
regard to the focal goal. I also examined the possibility that where the feasibility of 
finding multifinal means is low a goal choice will take place, whereby people would 
inhibit the alternative goal. To test this hypothesis I measured the level of activation of 
the alternative goal.   
Method 
Pre-testing the stimulus materials. I first conducted a pre-test in order to identify 
alternative goals that were commonly pursued by a majority of students at the University 
of Maryland and that varied in the degree to which they shared means with the goal of 
“being healthy” (that I subsequently defined for participants as the focal goal). To this 
end, I asked 40 students whether “being healthy” was a goal that they were actively 
trying to attain and how important this goal was for them. Participants were then asked to 
list three other goals that they were planning to accomplish in the near future. Participants 
were specifically instructed to list one goal that shared a lot of common means with the 
focal goal of being healthy, another goal that shared only a few common means with the 




asked our participants to list all the activities one can engage in, in order to maintain good 
health (i.e., defined as means to the focal goal).  
A majority of the participants listed “being in shape” as a goal that shared many 
means with “being healthy”, “doing well in school” as a goal which shared few means 
with “being healthy” and “drinking alcohol” as a goal that shared no means with the 
health goal. The participants also generated 30 activities as means to the goal of being 
healthy including “to avoid drugs,” “to stay focused,” “to go to the gym,” “to sleep well,” 
“ to eat well,” etc. (see appendix B). A separate group of thirty participants evaluated the 
instrumentality of these means (activities) with regard to each of the four goals. This was 
accomplished on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = “not instrumental at all” to 7 = “very 
instrumental”. I then looked at the number of means whose perceived instrumentality fell 
above the midpoint of the scale. Not surprisingly, all the means were evaluated as 
relatively useful with regard to the goal of being healthy, exceeding the midpoint of the 
scale (M = 5.13). Twenty-nine of the thirty means generated were evaluated as also 
instrumental to the goal of “being in shape” (M = 5.00), whereas only twenty means were 
evaluated as instrumental to the goal of “doing well in school” (M = 4.90). 
Unsurprisingly, none of the means generated with respect to the goal of being healthy 
was perceived as instrumental to the goal of “drinking alcohol” (M = 2.90). As instructed 
then, the high feasibility goal that participants listed (“being in shape”) appeared to share 
a high number of means with the focal goal, the intermediate feasibility goal (“doing well 
in school”) shared a lower number of common means with the focal goal, and the low 




Participants. One hundred four University of Maryland students, 33 males and 71 
females participated in this study in exchange for course credit. Gender did not yield any 
significant results and it will be, therefore, omitted from further discussion.   
Procedure. Based on the exploratory findings presented above, in the present 
study I first introduced the focal goal of “being healthy. To this end, participants were 
asked to rate on a 7-point scale the importance of “being healthy” for themselves and for 
others (1 = “not important at all” to 7 = “very important”) and the extent to which they 
were actively engaged in the pursuit of this goal (1 = “a lot” to 7 = “not at all”).  I then 
introduced the independent variable, the feasibility of finding multifinal means, by 
subliminally priming the alternative goal in three experimental conditions. In the high 
feasibility condition, the prime consisted of “being in shape,” in the moderate feasibility 
condition, the prime consisted of “doing well in school,” and in the low feasibility 
condition the prime consisted of “drinking alcohol.”  I also included a control condition 
in which no alternative goal was primed. I assumed that this condition would yield a 
baseline number of means that participants may generate to the focal goal.  
While being primed with the alternative goal, the  participants were presented 
with the list of 30 activities generated during the pre-test as means to the focal goal of 
“being healthy” and were asked to select those activities in which they were currently 
engaged and/or they were planning to engage in the near future. The number of activities 
selected defined the dependent variable. The priming of the alternative goal and the 
choice of the means with regard to the focal goal was accomplished in a modified lexical 
decision task (see Shah et al., 2003 for a similar procedure). Specifically, rather than 




lexical decision task, I asked them to judge whether the target stimulus represented an 
activity that participants were currently pursuing or planning to pursue in the near future. 
Each target was preceded by a subliminal prime. There were thirty primes consisting 
either of words representing the alternative goal in each of the three experimental 
conditions or of neutral words in the control condition. For instance, I primed “shape,” 
“figure,” and “exercise” for the alternative goal of “being in shape;” “school” “grades,” 
and “exam,” for “doing well in school;” and “drink,” “alcohol,” and “party,” for 
“alcohol.” In the control condition, the primes included neutral words such as “table” and 
“chair. The list of the words used to prime the alternative goal in each condition is 
presented in appendix C. I ensured that the primed words were relatively equal in length 
and frequency in the active vocabulary The targets consisted of the thirty activities 
generated as means toward the focal goal of drinking “being healthy” during the pre-test. 
All the activities were phrased in one to four words such as “stay focused,” “sleep well,” 
“eat balanced,” “be self-disciplined,” etc.  
The prime word appeared in white at the center of the black screen for 40ms and 
was immediately forward and backward masked to ensure that it did not reach the 
threshold of conscious awareness (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). After 700ms the mask was 
in turn replaced by the target representing an activity (a means) and participants were 
instructed to press “Z” if they were not currently pursuing/planning to pursue the activity 
or “/” if they were currently pursuing/planning to pursue that activity. The 740 ms 
interval between the prime and target onsets defines the stimulus onset asynchrony 




I base the procedure on the notion that goal-relevant knowledge should be more 
accessible upon the activation of a particular goal (Bruner & Postman, 1948; Aarts, 
Dijksterhuis, & De Vries, 2001; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Ferguson, Hassin, & Bargh, 
2007; Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, & Chassin, 2003). As Ferguson et al. (2007) noted, 
“the current goals of a perceiver provide limitations and constraints on the types of 
knowledge accessible in the memory and this drives perceiver’s attention toward certain 
elements within the environment” (p. 22). I therefore assumed that activation of the focal 
and the alternative goal will render those means perceived instrumental to these goals 
more accessible, and hence more likely to be chosen by the participants as activities they 
are currently engaged in.  
Before they engaged in a second lexical decision task designed to measure the 
activation of the alternative goal, participants completed a filler task. They were asked to 
rate the extent to which they perceived the goal of “being healthy” to be related to each of 
the three alternative goals, “being in shape”, “doing well in school” and “drinking 
alcohol.”  
Finally, participants completed a second lexical decision task to assess the 
accessibility of the alternative goal after being primed with the focal goal or with neutral 
words (for a similar procedure see Shah & Kruglanki, 2002; Shah et al., 2003). The 
procedure was a typical sequential priming procedure widely used to asses the impact 
that activation of a specific construct may have on other related constructs (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000; Fazio, 1990). At the beginning of each trial, a fixation point (“X”) 
appeared in the center of the screen for 2 seconds to indicate to participants where to 




backward and forward masked. The mask was in turn replaced by a target word and 
participants were instructed to decide as quickly as possible whether the targets 
represented words or non-words. Again, the stimulus onset asynchrony was 750ms. The 
relatively long prime duration and SOA were intended to increase the  power to detect a 
priming effect by allowing both increased processing time for the prime and increased 
time for inhibitory processes to come into play (for a similar discussion see Fishbach et 
al., 2003).  
The entire task consisted of 120 trials. In 45 of the trials participants were primed 
with the focal goal through words such as “health”, “fit”, “well”, etc. and responded to 
targets representing their alternative goal (e.g., “school”) as well as the alternative goals 
corresponding to the other two conditions (e.g., “alcohol”, “shape”). Because of the 
possibility that words representing the alternative goal of “drinking alcohol” may elicit a 
“perceptual defense” kind of process (Bruner, 1951) that would slow participants’ 
reaction times I also had the participants respond to the alternative goals after being 
primed with a neutral word rather than the focal goal in 45 trials. The remaining 30 trials 
consisted of neutral primes and neutral and non-word targets to assess participants’ 
baseline reaction time.  
Finally, I administered a modified funnel-type debriefing procedure (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000) to ascertain that the priming procedures were indeed subliminal. 
Although some of the participants reported to have seen words flashing during the 




Results and Discussion 
Reduction in the number of means. A one-way ANOVA which analyzed the effect 
of feasibility on the number of means/activities that participants selected yielded a 
significant main effect,(F(3, 100) = 20.33, p < .01) . As revealed by the predicted 
contrasts of interest, participants in the moderate feasibility condition selected fewer 
means/activities (M = 18.45) than did participants in the high feasibility condition (M = 
22.21), t(100) = 6.63, p < .001. However, the number of means selected in the high 
feasibility condition did not significantly differ from the number of means selected in the 
control no alternative goal condition (M = 22.46), t < 1.  Moreover, the number of means 
selected by the participants in the low feasibility condition (M = 21.46) did not 
significantly differ from the number of means selected in the control, no alternative goal, 
condition, t(100) = 1.7, p = .08. These results are summarized in figure 6.  
Multifinality of the Means. So far, the results indicate that a number of selected 
means to the focal goal depends on the relationship between the focal and the alternative 
goals. To explore the possibility that such selection reflects a multifinality quest, I next 
looked at perceived instrumentality of the selected means with regard to the alternative 
goal. Based on the pre-test evaluation of perceived instrumentality of the means/activities 
with respect to the alternative goal, for each participant, I first computed an average score 
representing perceived instrumentality of the selected means with regard to the 
corresponding alternative goal. An one-way ANOVA revealed an overall significant 
effect of feasibility on perceived instrumentality of the means with regard to the 
alternative goal (F(1, 75) = 42.54, p < .01). Interestingly, although I observed a reduction 




alternative goal was perceived to share few means in common (in the intermediate 
feasibility condition) vs. many means in common with this goal (in the high feasibility 
condition), there was no significant difference in the perceived instrumentality of the 
means with regard to the alternative goal between these two conditions (M = 4.55 vs. M = 
4.75, t(75) = 1.63, p > .05). This finding is consistent with the notion that the reduction in 
the number of means selected to the focal goal was motivated by a multifinality quest of 
finding means that are instrumental with respect to both the focal and the alternative 
goals.  
Also consistent with this interpretation was the finding of a significant difference 
between perceived instrumentality to the alternative goals of means selected by 
participants in the low feasibility condition. Specifically, though the number of selected 
means to the focal goal was greater in the low feasibility versus moderate feasibility 
conditions, the instrumentality of the means  to the alternative goal was significantly 
greater in the latter versus the former condition (M = 4.55 vs. M = 3.73, t(75) = 6.81, p < 
.01). This finding suggests that where the feasibility of finding common means is very 
low, participants give up on the multifinality quest and select focal means without regard 


































Figure 6 Number of activities (means) selected with regard to the focal goal of “being healthy” as a 
function of feasibility of finding multifinal means (Study 2) 
 
Intergoal inhibition. I additionally hypothesized that where the feasibility of 
finding common means is low, participants may execute a goal choice by inhibiting the 
alternative goal altogether. To explore this possibility, I calculated an average of 
participants’ lexical decision times to words related to their alternative goal after being 
primed with the focal goal. Because the latency of incorrect responses would be difficult 
to interpret in terms of inhibitory strength, only correct responses were used in the 
analyses (Bargh, Chaicken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio, 1990). All individual 
reaction times were first transformed using a natural log transformation to lessen the 
influence of outliers (Fazio, 1990).  
To control for the general accessibility of the alternative goals I averaged 
participants’ reaction times to their alternative goal after being primed with neutral 
words. I assumed that slower reaction times to the alternative goal after being primed 
with the focal goal vs. a neutral prime would indicate that the focal goal resulted in an 




to get a baseline reaction time I calculated participants’ average reaction times to neutral 
words, non-words and goals primed in the alternative experimental conditions. I then 
performed a repeated measures analysis of variance on participants’ average reaction 
time to the alternative goal when the focal goal served as prime vs. when a neutral word 
served as prime while simultaneously controlling for (co-varying out) their baseline 
reaction time.  
As illustrated by the untransformed latencies presented in figure 7, an inhibition 
of the alternative goal appears to have occurred, but only when the alternative goal 
(“drinking alcohol”) was perceived to share no means with the focal goal of “being 





























Figure 7 Lexical decision time for alternative goal targets when primed with the focal goal or with a 
neutral word (Study 2) 
 
Specifically, after controlling for the baseline reaction time to non-words, neutral 
words and other goals, participants in this condition responded significantly more slowly 




a neutral prime (572ms. vs. 552ms, F(1, 22) = 4.28, p = .05). By contrast, participants in 
the other two conditions did not show such inhibitory effect. Indeed, participants in the 
“doing well in school” and “being in shape” conditions responded as fast to their 
alternative goal after being primed with the focal goal as they did after being primed with 
a neutral prime (546ms vs. 555ms and 541ms. vs. 574, F < 1).   
In summary, findings of Study 2 replicate and extend those of Study 1. In the 
present study too, introduction of an alternative goal reduced the number of means to the 
focal goal. Of particular interest, the extent of such reduction depended on the nature of 
perceived relationship between the focal and the background goals: When these two goals 
were perceived to share numerous common means, no restriction in the number of 
“focal” means was observed. By contrast, when the two goals shared fewer (though still 
some) means in common, substantial reduction in the number of selected “focal” means 
took place such that the means selected with regard to the focal goal of “being healthy” 
were those activities that appeared to serve the background goal of “doing well in school” 
as well. Finally, when a background goal essentially shared no means in common with 
the focal goal of “being healthy” (i.e., “drinking alcohol”), participants were less 
selective with regard to the means/activities that they chose.  
In this latter condition, hardly any restriction was observed in the number of 
means selected with regard to the focal goal. Moreover, the selected means in this 
condition were not instrumental with regard to the alternative goal of “drinking alcohol”, 
and indeed this goal appears to have been inhibited (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 
2003)1.  
                                               
1 Although the results are consistent with my hypothesis a pertinent question may be raised with regard to 




Generally speaking, results of Studies 1 and 2 are consistent with the notion that a 
quest for multifinality may take place where in addition to the focal goal people are also 
attempting to pursue a background goal. Study 2 has also indicated that one boundary 
condition of such a quest has to do with its feasibility. Specifically, where the feasibility 
of finding multifinal means is very high, no restriction in the number of “focal” means is 
taking place, nor does such restriction occur where the feasibility of finding multifinal 
means is very low. Thus, a curvilinear relation appears to exist between feasibility and 
the multifinality constraint effect of reduction in the means (generated or selected) for 
pursuit of a given focal goal.   
The final study aimed to explore a second boundary condition of the multifinality 
constraint effect, namely, the degree of commitment to the focal goal. I assume that 
increased commitment to the focal goal should reduce the impact of alternative goals on 
focal means’ generation, and that it should do so through inhibition of the alternative 
goals (Shah, Friedman & Kruglanski, 2003).   
                                                    
Study 3 
 
Whereas the two former studies kept the focal goal constant and manipulated the 
presence (and/or type) of the alternative goal, the present study held the alternative goal 
                                                                                                                                            
abstractness. Although our sample is based on a college population which is known for being particularly 
interested in the procurement and consumption of alcohol, the goals of “doing well in school” and “being in 
shape” seem to be more general and abstract than the goal of “drinking alcohol”. The later could be 
conceived as a means toward a more general goal of “getting high” rather than a goal in itself. In such case, 
one can argue that the reduction in the number of means in the low feasibility condition may have been 
driven by an absence of an alternative goal with equal driving power as the alternative goals in the other 
two conditions rather than by the inhibition of the alternative goal induced by the difficulty to find 




(of keeping a healthy diet) constant and varied commitment to the focal goal of “eating” 
by varying the degree of hunger. Participants’ level of hunger (i.e., desire to pursue the 
goal of “eating”) was manipulated by priming them with eating-related vs. neutral words. 
Participants were subsequently asked to rate their interest in different types of foods, 
some healthy and some unhealthy (i.e. highly caloric and fatty) but tasty. As a measure of 
alternative goal inhibition, in a lexical decision task, I recorded participants’ reaction 
times to diet-related words. I hypothesized that priming participants with eating-related 
words during lunch hours would increase their experienced level of hunger, and therefore 
their commitment to the goal of “eating”. Increased commitment should inhibit the 
alternative goal of “healthy diet” reducing its multifinality constraints on means to the 
focal goal. Consequently, I expected hungrier participants to find a higher number of 
foods appealing, than the less hungry participants. Specifically, if hungrier participants do 
inhibit the alternative goal of “keeping a healthy diet” they should be less selective with 
regard to the foods they choose. Thus, I expected hungrier participants to be interested in 
all types of food, regardless of their health value. By contrast, the less hungry participants 
presumed to have the “eating” and “healthy diet” goals in mind were expected to be more 
interested in healthy (i.e., low calorie and low fat) versus unhealthy (i.e., high calorie and 
high fat) foods.     
Method 
Participants. Sixty-one University of Maryland, psychology majors participated 
in the experiment in exchange for course credit. Participants rated (on 10-point scales, 1 = 
“not at all,” and 10 = a lot”) the extent to which they watched their weight. They also 




correlated (r(60) = .48, p < .001) and I averaged them into a single score of participants’ 
commitment to a healthy diet. Only participants who scored above the mid point (5) on 
this measure were included in the experiment. Participants also reported whether they had 
lunch or not and I only selected those participants who had not had lunch, leaving us with 
43 participants, 13 males and 30 females. Participants’ gender had no effect on any of the 
results and will not be discussed further.  
Procedure. Participants completed the entire experiment on desktop computers, 
during lunch hours. They were informed that the experiment concerned “students’ 
culinary interests at different times of day. In addition to the questions related to their 
weight watching and expectancy to eat healthy in the future, I asked participants to rate 
how hungry and tired they were at that moment (1 = “not hungry/tired at all,” 10 = “very 
hungry/tired”). These questions were embedded among other, filler, items.  
The manipulation was introduced after this initial round of ratings. In a lexical 
decision task, participants were primed either with eating-related words (“lunch”, “food”, 
“eat”), expected to increase their hunger experience, and, hence, their commitment to the 
goal of “eating”, or neutral/control words (“chair”, “table”, “cartoon”, etc.) assumed to 
have no such effect. As a cover story, participants were told that this “attentional task” 
that they would be completing both at the beginning and at the end of the experiment 
assesses people’s ability to focus their attention at different times of day.  
Specifically, participants were told that the task required them to identify as 
quickly and as accurately as possible whether a presented target was a word or a non-
word. At the beginning of each trial, a fixation point (“X”) appeared at the center of the 




point was then replaced by a target word or non-word.  Participants were instructed to 
press the “1” key if the target was identified as a word and the “0” key if it was identified 
as a non-word.  
After several practice trials including words as well as non-words, participants 
were presented with the 24 experimental trials.  In the high commitment condition 18 of 
these contained eating-related words, 3 contained neutral words and 3 contained non-
words. In the low commitment condition, 18 trials contained neutral words and 6 
contained non-words. Note that since the only purpose of this task was to prime 
participants in the experimental (but not in the control) condition with eating-related 
words I did not record participants’ reaction times. The primes used in this manipulation 
are listed in appendix D.  
After completing the lexical decision task, participants were presented with a list 
of 20 foods (presented in appendix E) and were instructed to choose the ones that they 
wanted to eat at that moment. Ten of these foods were considered unhealthy but tasty 
(“pizza”, “burger”, “fries”, etc) and ten were considered healthy (“salad”, “vegetable 
soup”, “strawberries”). I regarded the latter foods as multifinal serving as they did both 
the goal of “eating” and that of “keeping a healthy diet”. The former, high-calorie, foods 
served solely the eating goal, hence in the present context I considered them “uni-final.” 
In order to ensure that the foods were indeed perceived unhealthy/tasty vs. healthy, in a 
pre-test, two external raters, one male and one female rated each of the 20 foods on three 
dimensions: their caloric content (1 = high caloric, 7 = low caloric), healthiness (1 = not 
healthy at all, 7 = very healthy) and tastiness (1 = not tasty at all to 7 = very tasty). The 




averaged the two raters’ scores into a single one for each dimension, caloric content, 
healthiness and tastiness. I then compared the two categories of foods (the 
unhealthy/tasty and the healthy) on each dimension. In contrast with the unhealthy but 
tasty foods, foods in the second category were indeed perceived to be less caloric (M = 
3.45 vs. M = 1.7, t(18) = 2.64, p = .01), healthier (M = 4.35 vs. M = 2.20, t(18) = 3.14, p 
< 01), but equally tasty (M = 6.10 vs. M = 5.95, t < 1).  
To assess whether high commitment to “eating” affected the accessibility of the 
alternative goal of “keeping a healthy diet” I used a similar procedure as the one used in 
Study 2. Specifically, in a lexical decision task, I measured participants’ reaction times to 
12 diet-related words (e.g., “diet”, “thin”, “fit”, “calories”) after subliminally (50ms) 
priming them with words related to the focal goal (“eat”, “food”, “lunch”) and neutral 
words (“chair”, “table”, etc.) I also measured participants’ reaction times to 12 neutral 
and non-words. All the words used in this lexical decision task are presented in appendix 
F. These thirty-six trials were presented in a random order.  Finally, I measured again 
participants’ degree of hunger and the extent to which they felt tired. I then administered 
a modified funnel-type debriefing procedure (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) to ascertain that 
the primes did not reach the awareness threshold. None of the participants reported any 
awareness of the primes.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. An ANOVA conducted on participants’ expressed degree of 
hunger following the priming manipulation and using their initial degree of hunger as a 
covariate showed that participants primed with eating-related words reported to be 




= .01.  It thus appears that the induction of the hunger experience via priming was 
effective.  
The Core Hypothesis.  I hypothesized that an increased commitment to the focal 
goal of “eating” should result in a reduction of multifinality constraints imposed by the 
goal of “healthy diet” on means to the focal goal. Thus, I expected participants in the 
increased commitment condition to select as appealing a higher number of foods than 
participants in the control condition. Specifically, participants in the control condition 
should be more selective with regard to the foods they selected, restricting their “means’ 
set” to foods that in addition to the “eating” goal would also fulfill the “healthy diet” 
goal. To test this hypothesis I conducted an analysis of variance on the number of foods 
participants selected. As predicted, participants primed with the eating words were 
interested in a greater number of foods than were participants primed with the neutral 
words (M = 7.42 vs. M = 5.33), F(1, 41) = 5.47, p < .05. 
In order to test whether goal priming affected differently participants’ preference 
for uni-final means (unhealthy foods) vs. multifnal means (healthy foods), I first 
calculated the number of healthy and non-healthy foods that each participant selected. I 
then conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance on these scores. A two-way 
interaction emerged between goal priming and type of foods (F(1, 41) = 4.26, p < .05). 
As shown in figure 7, participants who were not primed with the eating goal (thus were 
less committed to eating) were interested in a greater number of healthy foods (M = 3.54) 
than of non-healthy foods (M = 1.79), t(23) = 4.27, p < .001. However, participants 
primed with the eating goal (thus more committed to eating) were no more interested in 































Figure 8 Number of healthy vs. non-healthy foods selected as means to the focal goal of eating as a 
function of commitment to eating (Study 3) 
 
Intergoal inhibition. Finally, I checked whether increased commitment to “eating” 
resulted in the predicted inhibition of the “healthy diet” goal. To that end, I looked at 
participants’ average reaction times to diet-related words after being primed with the 
focal goal vs. the neutral prime in the second lexical decision task. I assumed that 
inhibition, or lowered accessibility of the goal, would be indicated by longer reaction 
times (Fishbach, et al., 2003, Shah, et al., 2002). Again, I only used correct responses in 
the analyses and I first log-transformed the raw reaction times to lessen the influence of 
outliers (Fazio, 1990). I then performed a repeated measures analysis of variance on 
participants’ average reaction time to the alternative goal of dieting when the focal goal 
served as prime vs. when a neutral word served as prime. After co-varying out the 




emerged between the prime (focal goal vs. neutral) as a within factor and commitment to 
“eating” as a between factor. (F(1, 39) = 7.60, p < .01). Hunger priming slowed down 
lexical decision times to diet-related targets. As depicted in figure 8, hungrier participants 
were significantly slower in recognizing diet-related words after being primed with the 
focal goal of eating than they were after being primed with a neutral prime (M = 627.92 
ms vs. M = 568.56 ms, F(1, 21) = 9.76, p < .01). However, the less hungry participants in 
the control condition did not differ in their reaction times to diet-related words as a 
function of the prime (M = 553.98 ms vs. M = 594.45 ms, F< 1). These results support 
the hypothesis that increased commitment to a focal goal results in the inhibition of the 


























Figure 9 Lexical decision time for diet-related targets when primed with the focal goal of eating or 
with a neutral word (Study 3) 
 
Mediation of commitment effects. To examine whether the effect of increased 
commitment to the focal goal (of eating) on number of “focal” means considered 




conducted two regression analyses. I first regressed the number of means selected on 
participants’ average reaction times to the dieting goal while simultaneously controlling 
for the baseline reaction time. A second regression was conducted to show that 
accounting for the direct effect of differences in participants’ reaction times to the dieting 
goal eliminates the effect of commitment on the number of means (Baron & Kenny, 
1986). The results of this analysis are presented in figure 9. As shown, participants’ 
reaction times to the dieting goal were found to have a significant positive effect on the 
number of means (β = .55, t = 3.26, p < .01) and to render nonsignificant the previously 
significant effect of increased commitment to the focal goal on the this number (β  = .17 
ns.). A Sobel test (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998) revealed that the complete mediating 








Figure 10 The effect of focal goal commitment on accessibility of the alternative goal and number of 
means selected (Study 3) 
 
In summary, where participants’ commitment to the focal goal of eating was 
heightened by the priming manipulation, this resulted in an inhibition of the alternative, 
“healthy diet” goal, which in turn has weakened the multifinality constraints it imposed 
Commitment to focal 
goal:  
High vs. Low 
Number of means 
selected 
Accessibility of the 
dieting goal 
 .17 (.34*) 
.55*  .46* 





on means to the focal goal, and increased the number and variety of means to the focal 
goal (i.e., different foods) that participants found appealing. These results illustrate the 
process by which people’s good intentions to maintain a healthy diet sometimes 
“evaporate” when they are hungry, namely by inhibiting the dieting goal while craving to 







Theorizing on the dynamics of action, Atkinson and Birch (1970) assumed that at 
any given point in time many different action tendencies may coexist at varying 
strengths. This idea did not initially capture attention, as most research on goals and 
motivation traditionally considered each striving separately. Recently, however, 
researchers have begun paying attention to the fact that in numerous real life 
circumstances goals do not function in isolation but rather share psychological space with 
alternative objectives (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Kruglanski et al, 2002; Shah & 
Kruglanski, 2002). People’s goals are often activated concurrently (or nearly so) by 
features of the external environment (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000) or by one’s internal 
stream of associations (James, 1890; Kruglanski et al., 2002). Such goals may often 
appear to be in conflict with each other and to compete for individuals’ limited resources 
(Anderson et al., 2004; Baumeister et al., 1998; Emmons & King, 1988; Shah & 
Kruglanski, 2002).  
The existence of goal conflict frequently implies the need to exercise goal choice. 
This may entail abandonment (Lewin, 1935,, 1951; Miller, 1944), or inhibition (Shah et 
al., 2002) of some of the competing objectives. As Emmons (1996) pointed out, however, 
creative integration of one’s strivings may be possible that would remove the detrimental 
effects of goal conflict on goal commitment, task performance, and affective experience. 
In the same vein, Cantor and Fleeson (1991, 1994) argued that people “tune” their goal 
pursuits, in the attempt to find the most suitable solutions under their personal 




that even though people may hold several goals simultaneously, and even though such 
goals may come into conflict with each other, people may try to avoid the conflict by 
seeking common means to sub-serve a maximal number of their active objectives.  
Multifinality Quest as a Strategy of Coping with Goal Conflict 
These notions received support in the present research. Study 1 demonstrated the 
basic narrowing of the focal means’ set when an alternative goal was introduced. Studies 
2 and 3 explored, additionally, the possibility that a quest for multifinal means is subject 
to boundary conditions having to do with (1) perceived feasibility of identifying 
multifinal means, serving both the focal and the alternative goals (Study 2),  and (2) the 
degree of commitment to the focal goal (Study 3). Specifically, Study 2 found that the 
relation between perceived feasibility of finding multifinal means and the reduction in the 
means’ set-size selected for the focal goal is curvilinear. Substantial reduction may occur 
at an intermediate range of feasibility, while no reduction may occurs where finding 
alternative means is either very feasible or very unfeasible. Whereas under low feasibility 
conditions the absence of reduction attests to goal choice, and occurs alongside an 
inhibition of the alternative goal, under high feasibility conditions no inhibition seems to 
occur, as the means selected afford the pursuit of both the focal and the alternative goal. 
These findings suggest that the mere presence of an alternative goal does not 
necessarily affect selection of means to the focal goal. It is rather the nature of the 
relationship between the focal and the alternative goal that does so. Thus, the number of 
the means to the focal goal is not affected if multifinal means to both goals can be readily 
found. This seems inconsistent with a distraction hypothesis whereby the mere 




via a pull of attentional resources. There is little reason to believe that the goals in the 
high feasibility or low feasibility conditions were any less distracting to participants than 
the goal in the moderate feasibility condition, yet they effected a significantly lesser 
reduction in means to the focal goal. It seems more likely that such reduction relates to 
the feasibility of finding multifinal means as presently suggested.  
Finally, Study 3 found support for the notion that increased commitment to the 
focal goal weakens the multifinality constraints imposed by the alternative goals and 
expands the number of means to the focal goal to include unifinal ones (e.g., unhealthy 
but tasty foods compatible only with the ‘eating’ but not the ‘healthy diet goal’). Study 3 
also found evidence that increased commitment to the focal goal results in an inhibition 
of the alternative goal, and that this mediates its weakened constraining effect on means 
to the focal goal.  
The present studies also contains evidence incompatible with an alternative 
interpretation of the present findings whereby introduction of the alternative goal reduces 
the commitment to the focal goal and that this is responsible for the observed reduction in 
the narrowing of the means’ set-size. The latter interpretation suggests a mere numeric 
reduction in the number of means and has no implications for the kinds of means 
selected. In contrast, the demonstrable multifinality of means selected in the moderate 
feasibility condition of Study 2 and in the low hunger (lower commitment to eating) 
condition of Study 3, attests to participants’ greater selectivity, unlikely to stem from a 
reduced commitment to the focal goal of eating. Rather, it seems to attest to a 




Multifinality quest in the broader context of research on goal pursuit 
  The present research is grounded in the theoretical assumptions about the 
structure and operation of goals that characterize the New Look approach to motivation. 
In this paradigm, goals constitute cognitive constructs that operate according to the basic 
principles of knowledge activation. By far the lion's share of the New Look research 
explored the phenomenon of goal activation and the extent to which an accessible goal is 
reflected in goal-relevant behavior. The research presented here aimed to move beyond 
documenting goal priming effects and to identify more subtle effects involving the 
calculated choice of behavioral plans or means for goal attainment. Unlike much of the 
research on goals, I assumed that goal pursuit and means choice occur in rich and 
complex contexts where the co-activation and pursuit of simultaneous goals is nearly 
inevitable. Given this assumption, the question that I tried to answer in the present 
research concerned the mechanisms underlying the choice of means to one’s goals in the 
context o multiple goal pursuits. 
The classic literature on goals referred to development of specific behavioral 
plans or strategies by which a goal can be attained (see Austin and Vancouver, 1996). 
Many goal-based models (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; 
Gollwitzer, 1993; Locke & Latham, 1990; Locke & Latham, 2002) conceived of behavior 
as an end point of a  conscious, deliberate process by which individuals create plans “by 
reflecting and deciding on when, where, and how” to act. (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 
1996). According to these models, plans allow people to mentally simulate goal pursuit, 
by testing alternative actions and by preparing for difficulties they anticipate during goal 




(Gollwitzer, 1993; Kuhl, 1984; Michel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996; Seijts & Latham, 
2001; Winters & Latham, 1996).  
By contrast with this classic research that presents a deliberate and effortful 
process of means selection, my research shows that such process derives directly from the 
structural and motivational principles of goals systems and may occur unconsciously. 
Specifically, the assumption that goal systems consist of mentally represented networks 
wherein goals may be cognitively associated to their corresponding means of attainment 
and to alternative goals via facilitative  and inhibitory links implies the possibility that 
activation of a specific goal will automatically result in the activation of other constructs 
associated with that goal, including its means of attainment. Indeed, growing empirical 
evidence support the idea that one characteristic of goal pursuit includes the accessibility 
of goal-relevant knowledge, goal-relevant evaluations, choice and behavior (see Fishbach 
& Ferguson, 2007 for a review). The research presented here provides additional support 
for this notion. However, unique to my research is the evidence suggesting that the 
principle of accessibility does not apply indiscriminatingly to the choice of means to 
advance goal pursuit, but is constrained by other motivational concerns such as outcome 
maximization. Specifically, I showed that during goal pursuit people chose means that 
would advance their simultaneous objectives and thus provide them with the maximal 
attainable value. When such a choice becomes excessively difficult, or impossible, or 
when the pursuit of the focal goal is very important, in order to maximize their outcome 
people resort to goal choice whereby alternative goals are inhibited. By inhibiting the 
alternative goals, people reallocate their resources to the successful attainment of their 




Although my research does not provide direct evidence for the unconscious aspect  
of means choice during multiple goal pursuit, the methodology that I used whereby the 
alternative goal was subliminally primed (particularly in Study 2) allows one to speculate 
that participants in this research may have been unaware of the real reasons driving their 
choice. Such speculation is encouraged by similar research which provides direct 
evidence that people may not be cognizant about the multifinal nature of the choices, nor 
of the background goals that might have affected it (Chun et al., 2005).  
Implications and future directions 
The quest for multifinal means appears quite rational and superior to a goal 
choice, as it promises to preserve the “cake”, while eating it too, representing a “best of 
possible worlds” motivationally speaking.  Nonetheless, identifying multifinal means has 
a down side as well, related to the reduced number of means to the focal goal that one 
might end up as a consequence of the effort to attain multifinality. Particularly where 
none of the generated means is assured to effect goal attainment, reduction in the overall 
number of means may also reduce the overall perceived attainment likelihood. Thus, the 
tradeoff here may involve increasing the (subjective) likelihood of attaining both the 
focal and the alternative goals while decreasing the attainment likelihood of the focal 
goal as such.  
Dilution or multifinality. Consistent with this idea, Zhang, Fishbach, and 
Kruglanski (2007) showed that increasing the number of goals that a single means can 
satisfy weakens the associative strength between that means and each individual goal and 
as a result it dilutes the perception of its instrumentality with respect to each goal. Indeed, 




increased (in Study 3) the impact on individuals’ means selection seemed to reflect an 
attempt to increase the likelihood of attaining the focal goal at the expense of attaining 
both it and the alternative goal. However, such process may sometimes be detrimental to 
self-regulation. Imagine the case of a diabetic person who needs to feed himself or herself 
while sticking to a rigorous low-carbohydrate diet even when he or she is very hungry 
(thus very committed to eating). In this particular case, choosing indiscriminately 
between foods to alleviate the hunger and “forgetting” about the diet may have grave 
consequences. It will be in this persons’ best interest to train himself/herself to counteract 
the dilution effect and opt for multifinal means (choose foods that will not put the dieting 
goal in danger) even when very hungry. Future research should address directly the 
impact of perceived instrumentality of the means and goal commitment on the means 
choice. Although the instrumentality of the multifinal means with respect to the focal 
goal (and thus the likelihood of being chosen during goal pursuit) may be diluted by its 
associations with other goals, one interesting possibility is that multifinal means 
sometimes becomes the most instrumental means to one’s focal goal (e. g. by 
experimentally strengthening the association between the focal goal and the means). In 
such circumstances one should be able to eliminate the effect of increased commitment to 
the focal goal on the quest for multifinal means and to show that people still prefer the 
multifinal means. In addition, the automatization of preference for multifinal means in the 
presence of the focal goal may result in a bottom-up priming of the alternative goal (by 
the means) which may counteract the process of goal choice that is typically associated 




Effects of increased commitment to the focal goal on range of acceptable means 
to that goal may have important real-life implications. Consider an increase in 
commitment to the goal of (personal and national) security occasioned by a belligerent 
enemy activity, e.g. an act of terrorism. This may inhibit the alternative goals derived 
from values of civil liberties, personal freedom, or the humane treatment of others.  
Consequently, various activities and policies might appear acceptable because they seem 
to serve the security goal, in oblivion of their consequences for other values and 
concerns. In other words, the multifinality constraint effect examined here in the context 
of simple individualistic pursuits (like health, or dieting) may have considerable social 
political implications that one may well want to investigate in further pertinent research. 
Commitment to the alternative goal. The research presented in this dissertation 
addresses only the impact of increased commitment to the focal goal on the quest for 
multifinal means. However, people often find themselves caught between equally 
important objectives such as career and family. The impact of a highly important 
alternative goal on the quest for means to an equally important focal goal requires further 
investigation. One possibility is that in such circumstances, when the focal and alternative 
goals are equally important, people will try harder to find common means and their effort 
will be reflected in more time devoted to find such means and in a better ability to find 
them compared to people for whom the two goals are of unequal importance. 
Instability in the preference for means. The underlying assumption of the 
multifinality constraints effect refers to the instability in one’s preference for means to 
the same focal goal depending on the alternative goal that happens to be currently active. 




means to a focal goal by inducing a preference for multifinal means, that is, means 
assumed to be instrumental also to the pursuit of alternative objective. However, in future 
research, it would be interesting to explore how people specifically shift their preference 




Traditionally, pursuit of multiple goals has been approached from the perspective 
of an inter-goal conflict (Lewin, 1935, 1951; Miller, 1944) and the presumed inevitability 
of goal choice. More recent analyses, however, raise the possibility that people devise 
self-regulatory strategies that circumvent the (unpleasant) necessity of sacrificing one 
goal for another, and seek instead ways of pursuing all present goal via the same means, 
attempting  to “kill two (or more) birds with one stone”  as it were (Kruglanski et al., 
2002; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002). The present research explored the implications of such 
strategy for the process of means generation and evaluation. The results suggest that 
activation of alternative goals reduces the number of means generated (or deemed 
acceptable) for the focal goal, that such process is likely due to the multifinality 
constraints imposed by these alternative goals, and that two important boundary 
conditions for such a process derive from 1) the perceived feasibility of finding multifinal 







The list of foods presented to participants in Study 1 
 
 
 Salad  
 Shrimps 






 Sandwich  





 Baked Potato 
 Crab cakes 
 Burger 
 Pasta 
 Prime Ribs 







The list of activities (means) presented to participants in Study 2  
 
1. eat well 
2. watch less TV 
3. wake up early 
4. join a team 
5. work hard 
6. do school work 
7. go out more 
8. eat breakfast 
9. prepare ahead 
10. drink less alcohol 
11. be motivated 
12. wash hands 
13. walk more 
14. have a positive attitude 
15. manage time well 
16. stay focused 
17. be self-disciplined 
18. take vitamins 
19. smile 
20. drink milk 
21. eat more proteins 
22. manage stress 
23. work out 
24. make friends 
25. go to the gym 
26. drink water 
27. stay active 
28. avoid drugs 
29. sleep well 







The list of words used to prime the alternative goal in Study 2.  
 
 
 Alternative goal 













































































 hot dog 
 tacos 
 carrots 
 vegetable soup 
 Chinese food 




 watermelon  






The list of “diet” related targets used in the lexical decision task in Study 3 
 
Primes Targets 
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